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Abstract
One of the key issues in the computational representation of open societies relates to the introduction
of norms that help to cope with the heterogeneity, the autonomy and the diversity of interests among
their members. Research regarding this issue presents two omissions. One is the lack of a canonical
model of norms that facilitates their implementation, and that allows us to describe the processes of
reasoning about norms. The other refers to considering, in the model of normative multi-agent systems,
the perspective of individual agents and what they might need to effectively reason about the society
in which they participate. Both are the concerns of this paper, and the main objective is to present a
formal normative framework for agent-based systems.
1 Introduction
Norms have long been used as mechanisms to limit
human autonomy in such a way that coexistence be-
tween self-interested and untrusted people has been
made possible. They are indispensable to overcome
problems of coordination of large, complex and het-
erogeneous systems where total and direct social con-
trol cannot be exerted. From this experience, the in-
troduction of norms that help to cope with the hetero-
geneity, the autonomy and the diversity of interests
among agents has been considered as a key issue to-
wards the computational representation of open soci-
eties of agents (Luck et al., 2003).
Although efforts have been made to describe and
define the different types of norms that agents have
to deal with (Dignum, 1999; Singh, 1999), work has
not led into a model that facilitates the computational
representation of any kind of norm. Each kind of
norm appears to be different, which also suggests that
different processes of reasoning should be proposed.
There are some work that introduces norms in sys-
tems of agents to represent societies, institutions and
organisations (Dellarocas and Klein, 2001; Dignum
and Dignum, 2001; Esteva et al., 2001; Shoham and
Tennenholtz, 1995). This research is primarily fo-
cused at the level of multi-agent systems, where
norms represent the means to achieve coordination
among their members. There, agents are assumed to
be able to comply with norms, to adopt new norms,
and to obey the authorities of the system but noth-
ing is said about the reasons why agents might be
willing to adopt and comply with norms, nor about
how agents can identify situations in which an au-
thority’s orders are beyond its responsibilities. That
is, although agents in such systems are said to be au-
tonomous, their models of norms and systems reg-
ulated by norms do not offer the means to explain
why autonomous agents that are working to satisfy
their own goals, still comply with their social respon-
sibilities. In addition, although the importance of
modelling compliance with norms as an autonomous
decision has been identified by several researchers
(Castelfranchi et al., 2000; Conte et al., 1999a; Conte
and Dellarocas, 2001; Conte et al., 1999), the issue is
only partly addressed by others whose proposals for
norm compliance generally rely on specific decision-
making strategies based on how much an agent gains
or loses by complying with (Barbuceanu et al., 1999;
Dignum et al., 2000), and on the probability of being
caught by a defender of a norm (Boella and Lesmo,
2001). We consider these cases as very specific and,
therefore, inadequate to model different kinds of nor-
mative behaviour of autonomous agents.
As a way to overcome these omissions, we have
developed a normative framework for agent-based
systems that includes a canonical model of norms, a
model of normative multi-agent systems and a model
of normative autonomous agents. Independent com-
ponents of this framework have already been pre-
sented in different forums (Lo´pez and Luck, 2003,
2004; Lo´pez et al., 2002, 2004). The objective of
this paper is to present the framework as a whole.
The formal model presented in this paper is written
in the Z language, which is based on set-theory and
first order logic (Spivey, 1992). The organisation of
the paper is as follows. First, a formal definition of
an autonomous agents is given. After that, an analy-
sis of different properties of norms is provided. This
analysis is then used to justify the elements that a gen-
eral model of a norm must include in order to enable
autonomous agents to reason about them. Next, the
main properties of systems of autonomous agents that
are regulated by norms are discussed and a model is
presented. Then, we describe our proposal to enable
agents to reason about norms. Finally, our conclu-
sions are provided.
2 Autonomous Agents
The foundations of this work are taken from Luck
and d’Inverno’s SMART agent framework (d’Inverno
and Luck, 2003) whose concept of motivations as the
driving force that affects the reasoning of agents in
satisfying their goals is considered as the underly-
ing argument for agents to voluntarily comply with
norms and to voluntarily enter and remain in a soci-
ety. In the SMART agent framework, an attribute
represents a perceivable feature of the agent’s envi-
ronment, which can be represented as a predicate or
its negation. Then, a particular state in the envi-
ronment is described by a set of attributes, a goal
represents situations that an agent wishes to bring
about, motivations are desires or preferences that af-
fect the outcome of the reasoning intended to satisfy
an agent’s goals, and actions are discrete events that
change the state of the environment when performed.
For the purposes of this paper, we formally describe
environmental states, goals, actions and autonomous
agents. Details of the remaining elements are not
needed, so we simply consider them as given sets.
[Attribute,Motivation]
EnvState == P
1
Attribute
Goal == P
1
Attribute
Action == EnvState → EnvState
AutonomousAgent
goals : PGoal ; capabilities : PAction;
motivations : PMotivation;
beliefs : P
1
Attribute
importance : P(PGoal × PMotivation)→ N
goals 6= ∅; motivations 6= ∅
∀ x : PGoal , y : PMotivation •
(x , y) ∈ dom importance |
x ⊆ goals ∧ y ⊆ motivations
In the above schema, an autonomous agent is de-
scribed by a set of goals that it wants to bring about,
a set of capabilities that it is able to perform, a non-
empty set of motivations representing its preferences,
and a set of beliefs representing its vision about the
external world. We also assume that the agent is able
to determine the importance of its goals, which de-
pends on its current motivations.
3 Norms
Norms facilitate mechanisms to drive the behaviour
of agents, especially in those cases when their be-
haviour affects other agents. Norms can be charac-
terised by their prescriptiveness, sociality, and social
pressure. In other words,
• a norm tells an agent how to behave (prescrip-
tiveness);
• in situations where more than one agent is in-
volved (sociality);
• and since it is always expected that norms con-
flict with the personal interest of some agents,
socially acceptable mechanisms to force agents
to comply with norms are needed (social pres-
sure).
By analysing these properties, the essential com-
ponents of a norm can be identified.
3.1 Norm Components
Norms specify patterns of behaviour for a set of
agents. These patterns are sometimes represented as
actions to be performed (Axelrod, 1986; Tuomela,
1995), or restrictions to be imposed over an agent’s
actions (Norman et al., 1998; Shoham and Tennen-
holtz, 1995). At other times, patterns of behaviour are
specified through goals that must either be satisfied
or avoided by agents (Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995;
Singh, 1999). Now, since actions are performed in
order to change the state of an environment, goals are
states that agents want to bring about, and restrictions
can be seen as goals to be avoided, we argue that by
considering goals the other two patterns of behaviour
can be easily represented (as shown in (Lo´pez and
Luck, 2003)).
In brief, norms specify things that ought to be done
and, consequently, a set of normative goals must be
included. Sometimes, these normative goals must
be directly intended, while at other times their role
is to inhibit specific states (as in the case of prohi-
bitions). Norms are always directed at a set of ad-
dressee agents, which are directly responsible for the
satisfaction of the normative goals. Moreover, some-
times to take decisions regarding norms, agents not
only consider what must be done but also for whom
it must be done. Then, agents that benefit from the
satisfaction of normative goals may also be included.
In general, norms are not applied all the time, but
only in particular circumstances or within a specific
context. Thus, norms must always specify the situ-
ations in which addressee agents must fulfill them.
Exception states may also be included to represent
situations in which addressees cannot be punished
when they have not complied with norms. Exceptions
represent immunity states for all addressee agents in
a particular situation (Ross, 1968). Now, to ensure
that personal interests do not impede the fulfillment
of norms, mechanisms either to promote compliance
with norms, or to inhibit deviation from them, are
needed. Norms may include rewards to be given
when normative goals become satisfied, or punish-
ments to be applied when they are not. Both rewards
and punishments are the means for addressee agents
to determine what might happen whatever decision
they take regarding norms. They are not the respon-
sibility of addressees agents but of other agents al-
ready entitled to either reward or punish compliance
and non-compliance with norms. Since rewards and
punishments represent states to be achieved, it is nat-
ural to consider them as goals but, in contrast with
normative goals that must be satisfied by addressees,
punishments and rewards are satisfied by agents enti-
tled to do so.
In other words, a norm must be considered for
fulfillment by an agent when certain environmental
states, not included as exception states, hold. Such
a norm forces a group of addressee agents to satisfy
some normative goals for a (possibly empty) set of
beneficiary agents. In addition, agents are aware that
rewards may be enjoyed if norms become satisfied, or
that punishments that affect their current goals can be
applied if not. The formal specification of a norm is
given in the Norm schema where all the components
of norms described here are included, together with
some constraints on them. First, it does not make
any sense to have norms specifying nothing, norms
directed at nobody, or norms that either never or al-
ways become applied. Thus, the first three predicates
in the schema state that the set of normative goals, the
set of addressee agents, and the context must never
be empty. The fourth predicate states that the set of
attributes describing both the context and exceptions
must be disjoint to avoid inconsistencies in identi-
fying whether a norm must be applied. The final
constraint specifies that punishments and rewards are
also consistent and, therefore, they must be disjoint.
Norm
normativegoals : PGoal
addressees : PNormativeAgent
beneficiaries : PNormativeAgent
context : EnvState
exceptions : EnvState
rewards : PGoal
punishments : PGoal
normativegoals 6= ∅
addressees 6= ∅
context 6= ∅
context ∩ exceptions = ∅
rewards ∩ punishments = ∅
3.2 Considerations
The term norm has been used as a synonym for obli-
gations (Boella and Lesmo, 2001; Dignum et al.,
2000), prohibitions (Dignum, 1999), social laws
(Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995), and other kinds of
rules imposed by societies (or by an authority). The
position of our work is quite different. It considers
that all these terms can be grouped in a general defini-
tion of a norm, because they have the same properties
(i.e. prescriptiveness, sociality and social pressure)
and they can be represented by the same model. They
all represent responsibilities for addressee agents, and
create expectations for beneficiaries and other agents.
They are also the means to support beneficiaries when
they have to claim some compensation in the sit-
uations where norms are not fulfilled as expected.
Moreover, whatever the kind of norm being consid-
ered, its fulfillment may be rewarded, and its viola-
tion may be penalised. What makes one norm dif-
ferent from another is the way in which they are cre-
ated, their persistence, and the components that are
obligatory in the norm. Thus, norms might be created
by an agent designer as built-in norms, they can be
the result of agreements between agents, or they can
be elaborated by a complex legal system. Regarding
their persistence, norms might be taken into account
during different periods of time, such as until an agent
dies, as long as an agent stays in a society, or just for a
short period of time until its normative goals become
satisfied. Finally, some components of a norm might
not exist; there are norms that include neither pun-
ishments nor rewards, even though they are complied
with. Some of these characteristics can be used to
provide a classification of norms into four main cate-
gories: obligations, prohibitions, social commitments
and social codes. Despite these differences, all types
of norms can be reasoned about in similar ways.
Now, to understand the consequences of norms in
a particular system, it is necessary to consider norms
that are either fulfilled or unfulfilled. However, since
most of the time a norm has a set of agents as ad-
dressees, the meaning of fulfilling a norm might de-
pend on the interpretation of analysers of a system. In
small groups of agents, it might be easy to consider
a norm as fulfilled when every addressee agent has
fulfilled the norm; by contrast, in larger societies, a
proportion of agents complying with a norm will be
enough to consider it as fulfilled. Instead of defining
fulfilled norms in general, it is more appropriate to
define norms being fulfilled by a particular addressee
agent. To do so, the concept of norm instances is in-
troduced as follows. Once a norm is adopted by an
agent, a norm instance is created, which represents
the internalisation of a norm by an agent (Conte and
Castelfranchi, 1995). A norm instance is a copy of
the original norm that is now used as a mental atti-
tude from which new goals for the agent might be in-
ferred. Norms and norm instances are the same con-
cept used for different purposes. Norms are abstract
specifications that exist in a society and are known by
all agents (Tuomela, 1995), but agents work with in-
stances of these norms. Consequently, there must be
a separate instance for each addressee of a norm. Due
to space constraints, formal definitions and examples
of categories of norms, norm instances and fulfilled
norms are not provided here but can be found else-
where (Lo´pez and Luck, 2003).
3.3 Interlocking Norms
The norms of a system are not isolated from each
other; sometimes, compliance with them is a condi-
tion to trigger (or activate) other norms. That is, there
are norms that prescribe how some agents must be-
have in situations in which other agents either com-
ply with a norm or do not comply with it (Ross,
1968). For example, when employees comply with
their obligations in an office, paying their salary be-
comes an obligation of the employer; or when a plane
cannot take-off, providing accommodation to passen-
gers becomes a responsibility of the airline. Norms
related in this way can make a complete chain of
norms because the newly activated norms can, in turn,
activate new ones. Now, since triggering a norm de-
pends on past compliance with another norm, we call
these kinds of norms interlocking norms. The norm
that gives rise to another norm is called the primary
norm, whereas the norm activated as a result of ei-
ther the fulfillment or violation of the first is called
the secondary norm.
In terms of the norm model mentioned earlier, the
context is a state that must hold for a norm to be
complied with. Since the fulfillment of a norm is
assessed through its normative goals, the context of
the secondary norm must include the satisfaction (or
non-satisfaction) of all the primary norm’s normative
goals. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of both the pri-
mary and the secondary norms and how they are inter-
locked through the primary norm’s normative goals
and the secondary norm’s context.
 
satisfied (or unsatisfied)  normative goals   
normative goals exceptions context . . . . . . 
normative goals exceptions context . . . . . . 
primary norm  
secondary norm   
Figure 1: Interlocking Norm Structure
Formally, a norm is interlocked with another norm
by non-compliance if, in the context of the secondary
norm, an instance of the primary norm can be consid-
ered as violated. This means that when any addressee
of a norm does not fulfill the norm, the correspond-
ing interlocking norm will be triggered. The formal
specification of this is given below, where n1 repre-
sents the primary norm and n2 is the secondary norm.
lockedbynoncompliance : P(Norm ×Norm)
∀n1,n2 : Norm •
lockedbynoncompliance (n1,n2)⇔
(∃ni : NormInstance |
isnorminstance (ni ,n1) •
¬ fulfilled (ni ,n2.context))
Similarly, a norm is interlocked with another norm
by compliance if, in the context of the secondary
norm, an instance of the primary norm can be con-
sidered as fulfilled. Thus, any addressee of the norm
that fulfills it will trigger the interlocking norm. The
specification of this is given as follows.
lockedbycompliance : P(Norm ×Norm)
∀n1,n2 : Norm •
lockedbycompliance (n1,n2)⇔
(∃ni : NormInstance |
isnorminstance (ni ,n1) •
fulfilled (ni ,n2.context))
Having the means to relate norms in this way al-
lows us to model how the normative behaviour of
agents that are addressees of a secondary norm is in-
fluenced by the normative behaviour of addressees of
a primary norm.
4 Normative Multi-Agent Sys-
tems
Since norms are social concepts, they cannot be stud-
ied independently of the systems for which they are
created and, consequently, an analysis of the norma-
tive aspects of social systems must be provided. Al-
though social systems that are regulated by norms
are different from one another, some general charac-
teristics can be identified. They consist of a set of
agents that are controlled by the same set of norms
ranging from obligations and social commitments to
social codes. However, whereas there are static sys-
tems in which all norms are defined in advance and
agents in the system always comply with them (Bo-
man, 1999; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995), a more
realistic view of these kinds of systems suggests that
when autonomous agents are considered, neither can
all norms be known in advance (since new conflicts
among agents may emerge and, therefore, new norms
may be needed), nor can compliance with norms be
guaranteed (since agents can decide not to comply).
We can say then, that systems regulated by norms
must include mechanisms to deal with both the modi-
fication of norms and the unpredictable normative be-
haviour of autonomous agents. So, normative multi-
agent systems have the following characteristics.
• Membership. Agents in a society must be able to
deal with norms but, above all, they must recog-
nise themselves as part of the system. This kind
of social identification means that agents adopt
the society norms and, by doing so, they show
their willingness to comply with these norms.
• Social Pressure. Effective authority cannot be
exerted if penalties or incentives are not ap-
plied when norms are either violated or com-
plied with. However, this control must not be
an agent’s arbitrary decision, and although it is
only exerted by some agents, it must be socially
accepted.
• Dynamism. Normative systems are dynamic
by nature. New norms are created and ob-
solete norms are abolished. Compliance or
non-compliance with norms may activate other
norms and, therefore, force other agents to act.
Agents can either join or leave the system. The
normative behaviour of agent members might be
unexpected, and it may influence the behaviour
of other agents.
Given these characteristics, we argue that multi-
agent systems must include mechanisms to defend
norms, to allow their modification, and to identify au-
thorities. Moreover, their members must be agents
able to deal with norms. Each one of these con-
cepts is discussed in detail and formalised in (Lo´pez
and Luck, 2004), here, we present just a summary of
them.
4.1 Normative Agents
The effectiveness of every structure of control relies
on the capabilities of its members to recognise and
follow its norms. However, given that agents are au-
tonomous, the fulfillment of norms can never be taken
for granted (Lo´pez et al., 2002). A normative agent is
an agent whose behaviour is partly shaped by norms.
They are able to deal with norms because they can
represent, adopt, and comply with them. However,
for autonomous agents, decisions to adopt or com-
ply with norms are made on the basis of their own
goals and motivations. That is, autonomous agents
are not only able to act on norms but also they are
able to reason about them. In what follows, all nor-
mative agents are considered as autonomous agents
that have adopted some norms (norms) and, has de-
cided which norms to comply with (intended norms)
and which norms to reject (rejected norms). Although
their normative behaviour is described in the next sec-
tion, their representation is given now in the schema
below.
NormativeAgent
AutonomousAgent
norms, intented , rejected : PNorm
intented ⊆ norms
rejected ⊆ norms
4.2 Enforcement and Reward Norms
Particularly interesting for this work are the norms
triggered in order to punish offenders of other norms.
We call them enforcement norms and their addressees
are the defenders of a norm. These norms repre-
sent exerted social pressure because they specify not
only who must apply the punishments, but also un-
der which circumstances these punishments must be
applied (Ross, 1968). That is, once the violation of a
norm becomes identified by defenders, their duty is to
start a process in which offender agents can be pun-
ished. For example, if there is an obligation to pay
accommodation fees for all students in a university,
there must also be a norm stating what hall managers
must do when a student refuses to pay.
As can be seen, norms that enforce other norms are
a special case of interlocking norms because besides
being interlocked by non-compliance, the normative
goals of the secondary norm must include every pun-
ishment of the primary norm. Figure 2 shows how
the structures of both norms are related. By mod-
elling enforcement norms in this way, we cause an
offender’s punishments to be consistent with a de-
fender’s responsibilities. Addressees of an enforced
norm (i.e. the primary norm) know what could hap-
pen if the norm is not complied with, and addressees
of an enforcement norm (i.e. the secondary norm)
know what must be done in order to punish the of-
fenders of another norm. Enforcement norms allow
the authority of defenders to be clearly constrained.
 
normative goals punishments context . . . . . . 
unsatisfied normative goals 
enforced norm 
enforcement norm 
normative goals exceptions context . . . . . . 
Figure 2: Enforcement Norm Structure
Formally, the relationship between a norm directed
to control the behaviour of some agents and a norm
directed at punishing the offenders of such a norm
can be defined as follows. A norm enforces another
norm if the first norm is activated when the second
is violated, and all punishments associated with the
violated norm are part of the normative goals of the
first. Every norm satisfying this property is known as
an enforcement norm.
enforces : P(Norm ×Norm)
∀n1,n2 : Norm • enforces (n1,n2)⇔
lockedbynoncompliance (n2,n1) ∧
n2.punishments ⊆ n1.normativegoals
So far we have described some interlocking norms
in terms of punishments because these are one of the
more commonly used mechanisms to enforce com-
pliance with norms. However, a similar analysis can
be applied to interlocking norms corresponding to
the process of rewarding members doing their du-
ties. These norms must be interlocked by compli-
ance and all the rewards included in the primary norm
(rewarded norm) must be included in the normative
goals of the secondary norm (reward norm). The re-
lation between these norms is shown in Figure 3.
Formally, we say that a norm encourages compli-
ance with another norm if the first norm is activated
when the second norm becomes fulfilled, and the re-
wards associated with the fulfilled norm are part of
 
normative goals rewards context . . . . . . 
satisfied normative goals 
rewarded norm 
reward norm 
normative goals exceptions context . . . . . . 
Figure 3: Reward Norm Structure
the normative goals of the first norm. Every norm
satisfying this property is known as a reward norm.
rewardnorm : P(Norm ×Norm)
∀n1,n2 : Norm • rewardnorm (n1,n2)⇔
lockedbycompliance (n2,n1) ∧
n2.rewards ⊆ n1.normativegoals
It is important to mention that this way of repre-
senting enforcement and reward norms can create an
infinite chain of norms because we would also have to
define norms to apply when authorities or defenders
do not comply with their obligations, either to punish
those agents breaking rules or to reward those agents
that fulfill their responsibilities (Ross, 1968). The de-
cision of when to stop this interlocking of norms is
left to the creator of norms. If a system requires it,
the model (and formalisation) for enforcing and en-
couraging norms can be used recursively as neces-
sary. There is nothing in the definition of the model
itself to prevent this.
Both enforcement and reward norms acquire par-
ticular relevance in systems regulated by norms be-
cause the abilities to punish and reward must be re-
stricted for use only by competent authorities (ad-
dressees of enforcement and reward norms). Oth-
erwise, offenders might be punished twice or more
if many agents take this as their responsibility. It
could also be the case that selfish agents demand un-
just punishments or that selfish offenders reject being
punished. That is, conflicts of interest might emerge
in a society if such responsibilities are given either to
no one or to anyone. Only through enforcement and
reward norms can agents become entitled to punish
or reward other agents.
4.3 Legislation Norms
Norms are introduced into a society as a means to
achieve social order. Some are intended to avoid con-
flicts between agents, others to allow the establish-
ment of commitments, and others still to unify the be-
haviour of agents as a means of social identification.
However, neither all conflicts nor all commitments
can be anticipated. Consequently, there must exist
the possibility of creating new norms (to solve unex-
pected and recurrent conflicts among agents), modi-
fying existing ones (to increase their effectiveness),
or even abolishing those that become obsolete. As
above, these capabilities must be restricted to avoid
conflicts of interest. That is, norms stating when ac-
tions to legislate are permitted must exist in a nor-
mative multi-agent system (Jones and Sergot, 1996).
Formally, we say that a norm is a legislation norm
if actions to issue and to abolish norms are permit-
ted by this norm in the current environment. These
constraints are specified below.
legislate : P(Norm × EnvState)
∀n : Norm; env : EnvState •
legislate (n, env)⇔
(∃ issuingnorms, abolishnorms : Action •
permitted (issuingnorms,n, env) ∨
permitted (abolishnorms,n, env))
4.4 Normative Multi-Agent Systems
Model
A normative multi-agent system is formally repre-
sented in the NormativeMAS schema. It com-
prises a set of normative agent members (i.e. agents
able to reason about norms) and a set of general
norms that govern the behaviour of these agents
(generalnorms). Norms issued to allow the creation
and abolition of norms (legislationnorms) are also
included. There are also norms dedicated to enforc-
ing other norms (enforcenorms) and norms directed
to encouraging compliance with norms through re-
wards (rewardnorms). Legislation, enforcement and
reward norms are better discussed in (Lo´pez and
Luck, 2004). The current state of the environment
is represented by the variable environment . Con-
straints over these components are imposed as fol-
lows. Although it is possible that agents do not know
all the norms in the system, it is always expected that
they at least adopt some norms, represented by the
first predicate. The second predicate makes explicit
that addressees of norms must be members of the
system. Thus, addressee agents of every norm must
be included in the set of member agents because it
does not make any sense to have norms addressed to
nonexistent agents. The last three predicates respec-
tively describe the structure of enforcement, reward
and legislation norms. Notice that whereas every en-
forcement norm must have a norm to enforce, not
every norm may have a corresponding enforcement
norm, in which case no one in the society is legally
entitled to punish an agent that does not fulfill such a
norm.
NormativeMAS
members : PNormativeAgent
generalnorms, legislationnorms : PNorm
enforcenorms, rewardnorms : PNorm
environment : EnvState
∀ ag : members •
ag .norms ∩ generalnorms 6= ∅
∀ sn : generalnorms •
sn.addressees ⊆ members
∀ en : enforcenorms •
(∃n : generalnorms • enforces (en,n))
∀ rn : rewardnorms •
(∃n : generalnorms • rewardnorm (rn,n))
∀ ln : legislationnorms •
legislate (ln, environment)
4.5 Normative Roles
Defining normative multi-agent systems in this way
allows the identification of the authorities of the sys-
tem as formalised in the AuthoritiesNMAS schema.
The set of agents that are entitled to create, mod-
ify, or abolish norms is called legislators. No other
members of the society are endowed with this au-
thority, and generally they are either elected or im-
posed by other agents. Defender agents are directly
responsible for the application of punishments when
norms are violated. That is, their main responsibil-
ity is to monitor compliance with norms in order to
detect transgressions. Moreover, they can also warn
agents by advertising the bad consequences of being
rebellious. By contrast, promoter agents are those
whose responsibilities include rewarding compliant
addressees. These agents also monitor compliance
with norms in order to determine when rewards must
be given, and instead of enforcing compliance with
norms, they simply encourage it.
AuthoritiesNMAS
NormativeMAS
legislators : PNormativeAgent
defenders : PNormativeAgent
promoters : PNormativeAgent
∀ lg : legislators • (∃ l : legislationnorms •
lg ∈ l .addressees)
∀ df : defenders • (∃ e : enforcenorms •
df ∈ e.addressees)
∀ pm : promoters • (∃ r : rewardnorms •
pm ∈ r .addressees)
5 Autonomous Normative Rea-
soning
Whereas agents that always comply with norms are
important for the design of societies in which total
control is needed (Boman, 1999; Shoham and Ten-
nenholtz, 1995), agents that can decide on the basis
of their own goals and motivations whether to com-
ply with them are important for the design of dy-
namic systems in which agents act on behalf of dif-
ferent users and, while satisfying their own goals,
are able to join a society and cooperate with other
agents. Autonomous norm reasoning is important
to address those situations in which an agent’s goals
conflict with the norms that control its behaviour in-
side a society. Agents that deliberate about norms
are also needed in systems in which unforseen events
might occur, and in those situations in which agents
are faced with conflicting norms, and they have to
choose between them. It should be clear that violation
of norms is, sometimes, justified. To describe norma-
tive reasoning, therefore, we have to explain not only
what might motivate an agent to adopt, dismiss or
complying with a norm, but also the way in which this
decision affects its goals. In consequence we propose
three different processes: one for agents to decide
whether to adopt a norm (the norm adoption process),
another to decide whether to comply with a norm (the
norm deliberation process), and the other to update
the goals, and therefore the intentions of agents ac-
cordingly (the norm compliance process). All these
processes must take into account not only the goals
and motivations of agents, but also the mechanisms
of the society to avoid violation of norms such as re-
wards and punishments. Thus, agents consider the
so called social pressure of norms before making any
decision.
5.1 The Norm Adoption Process
The norm adoption process can be better defined as
the process through which agents recognise their re-
sponsibilities towards other agents by internalising
the norms that specify these responsibilities. Thus,
agents adopt the norms of a society either once they
have decided to join it or in the case a new norm
is issued while they are still there. For autonomous
agents to join and stay in a society the social sat-
isfaction condition must hold (Lo´pez et al., 2004).
An agent considers this condition as satisfied if, al-
though some of its goals become hindered by its re-
sponsibilities, its important goals can still be satis-
fied. Thus, we consider that the following conditions
must be satisfied for agents to adopt a norm: the agent
must recognise itself as an addressee of the norm; the
norm must not already be adopted; the norm must
have been issued by a recognised authority; and the
agent must have reasons to stay in the society. No-
tice that to adopt a norm as an end, only the first
three conditions are needed, whereas the last condi-
tion is an indicator that the decision to adopt a norm
is made in an autonomous way. Due to space con-
straints, the NormAdoption schema only formalises
the first three conditions but details of the fourth con-
dition can be found elsewhere (Lo´pez et al., 2004).
NormAdoption
∆NormativeAgent
new? : Norm
issuer?, self : NormativeAgent
authorities : PNormativeAgent
issuedby : P(Norm ×NormativeAgent)
self ∈ new?.addressees
new? 6∈ norms
(new?, issuer?) ∈ issuedby ⇔
issuer? ∈ authorities
norms ′ = norms ∪ {new?}
5.2 The Norm Deliberation Process
To comply with the norm, agents assess two things:
the goals that might be hindered by satisfying the nor-
mative goals, and the goals that might benefit from
the associated rewards. By contrast, to reject a norm,
agents evaluate the damaging effects of punishments
(i.e. the goals hindered due to the satisfaction of the
goals associated with punishments.) Since the satis-
faction of some of their goals might be prevented in
both cases, agents use the importance of their goals
to make these decisions. This, to deliberate about a
norm, an agents pursues the following steps.
• A set of active norms is selected from the set of
adopted norms (norm instances). Active norms
are those that agents believe must be complied
with in the current state, which is not an excep-
tion state (i.e. those norms for which the context
matches the beliefs of the agent).
• The agent divides active norms into non-
conflicticting and conflicting norms. An active
norm is non-conflicting if its compliance does
not cause any conflict with one of the agent’s
current goals. Thus, no goals of the addressee
agent are hindered by satisfying the normative
goals of the norm. By contrast, an active norm
is conflicting if its fulfillment hinders any of the
agent’s goals.
• For each one of these sets of norms, the agent
must decide which one to comply with. De-
tails of different ways to select the norms to be
intended or rejected are given in (Lo´pez et al.,
2002). After norm deliberation, the set of in-
tended norms consists of those conflicting and
non-conflicting norms that are accepted to be
complied with by the agent, and the set of re-
jected norms consists of all conflicting and non-
conflicting norms that are rejected by the agent.
The state of an agent that has selected the norms
it is keen to fulfill is formally represented in the
NormAgentState schema. This represents a nor-
mative agent with a variable representing the sets
of active norms at a particular point of time. The
conflicting predicate holds for a norm if and only if
its normative goals conflict (hinder ) with any of the
agent’s current goals. The next three predicates state
that active norms are the subset of adopted norms that
the agent believes must be complied with in the cur-
rent state and that, the set of active norms has already
been assessed and divided into norms to intend and
norms to reject. The state of an agent is consistent in
that its current goals do not conflict with the intended
norms and, consequently, no normative goal must be
in conflict with current goals. Moreover, since re-
wards benefit the achievement of some goals, so that
agents do not have to work on their satisfaction be-
cause someone else does, these goals must not be part
of the goals of an agent. The final predicate states that
punishments must be accepted and, therefore, none of
the goals of an agent must hinder them.
NormAgentState
NormativeAgent
activenorms, conflicting : PNorm
∀n : activenorms • conflicting n ⇔
hinder(goals,n.ngoals) 6= ∅
activenorms ⊆ norms
∀ an : activenorms •
logcon (beliefs, an.context)
activenorms = intended ∪ rejected
hinder(goals,normgoals intended) = ∅
benefit(goals, rewardgoals intended)
∩goals = ∅
hinder(goals, punishgoals rejected) = ∅
For a norm to be intended, some constraints must
be fulfilled. First, the agent must be an addressee of
the norm. Then, the norm must be an adopted and
currently active norm, and it must not be already in-
tended. In addition, the agent must believe that it is
not in an exception state and, therefore, it must com-
ply with the norm. Formally, the process to accept a
single norm as input (new?) to be complied with is
specified in the NormIntend schema. The first five
predicates represent the constraints on the agent and
the norm as described above. The sixth predicate rep-
resents the addition of the accepted norm to the set of
intended norms and the final predicate represents the
set of rejected norms remains the same.
NormIntend
new? : Norm
∆NormAgentState
self ∈ new?.addressees
new? ∈ norms
new? ∈ activenorms
new? 6∈ intended
¬ logcon(beliefs,new?.exceptions)
intended ′ = intended ∪ {new?}
rejected ′ = rejected
The process to reject a norm (NormReject) can be
defined similarly. Now, there are different ways to se-
lect the norms to be intended or rejected as explained
in (Lo´pez et al., 2002). Here, we describe what is
called a pressured strategy where an agent fulfills a
norm only in the case that one of its goals is threat-
ened by punishments. That is, agents are pressured to
obey norms through the application of punishments
that might hinder some of their important goals. In
this situation, the agent faces four different cases.
1. The norm is a non-conflicting norm and some
goals are hindered by its punishments.
2. The norm is a non-conflicting norm and there are
no goals hindered by its punishments.
3. The norm is a conflicting norm and the goals
hindered by its normative goals are less impor-
tant than the goals hindered by its punishments.
4. The norm is a conflicting norm and the goals
hindered by its normative goals are more impor-
tant than the goals hindered by its punishments.
The first case represents the situation in which, by
complying with a norm, an agent does not put at risk
any of its goals (because the norm is non-conflicting),
but if the agent decides not to fulfill it, some of its
goals could be unsatisfied due to punishments. Con-
sequently, fulfilling a norm is the best decision for
this kind of agent. To formalise this, we use the
NormIntend operation schema to accept complying
with the norm, and we add two predicates to specify
that this strategy is applied to non-conflicting norms
whose punishments hinder some goals.
PressuredNCComply
NormIntend
¬ conflicting new?
hinder(goals,new?.punishments) 6= ∅
In the second case, by contrast, since punishments
do not affect an agent’s goals, it does not make any
sense to comply with the norm, so it must be rejected.
Formally, the NormReject operation schema is used
when the norm is non-conflicting (first predicate) and
its associated punishments do not hinder any existing
goals (second predicate).
PressuredNCReject
NormReject
¬ conflicting new?
hinder(goals,new?.punishments) = ∅
According to our definition, a conflicting norm is a
norm whose normative goals hinder an agent’s goals.
In this situation, agents comply with the norm at the
expense of existing goals only if what they can lose
through punishments is more important than what
they can lose by complying with the norm. For-
mally, a conflicting norm is intended if the goals that
could be hindered by punishments (hps) are more
important than the set of existing goals hindered by
normative goals (hngs). This is represented in the
PressuredCComply schema where the importance
function uses the motivations associated with the set
of goals to find the importance of goals.
PressuredCComply
NormIntend
conflicting new?
let hps == hinder(goals,
new?.punishments) •
let hngs == hinder(goals,new?.ngoals) •
importance (motivations, hps) >
importance (motivations, hngs)
However, if the goals hindered by normative goals
are more important than the goals hindered by pun-
ishment, agents prefer to face such punishments for
the sake of their important goals and, therefore, the
norm is rejected. Formally, a conflicting norm is re-
jected by using the NormReject operation schema if
the goals hindered by its punishments (hps) are less
important than the goals hindered by its normative
goals (hngs).
PressuredCReject
NormReject
conflicting new?
let hps == hinder(goals,new?.punishments) •
let hngs == hinder(goals,new?.ngoals) •
importance (motivations, hps) ≤
importance (motivations, hngs)
All these cases are illustrated in Figure 4




conflicting 
norm 
hps ≠ ∅ 
non-conflicting 
norm 
hps = ∅ 
comply  
do not comply  
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by normative goals 
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by punishments 
 importance of hngs 
≤ importance of hps comply  
do not comply 
 importance of hngs  
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Figure 4: Pressured Norm Compliance
5.3 The Norm Compliance Process
Once agents take a decision about which norms to ful-
fill, a process of norm compliance must be started in
order to update an agent’s goals in accordance with
the decisions it has made. An agent’s goals are af-
fected in different ways, depending on whether the
norm is intended or rejected. The cases can be listed
as follows.
• All normative goals of an intended norm must be
added to the set of goals because the agent has
decided to comply with it.
• Some goals are hindered by the normative goals
of an intended norm. These goals can no longer
be achieved because the agent prefers to com-
ply with the norm and, consequently, this set of
goals must be removed from the agent’s goals.
• Some goals benefit from the rewards of an in-
tended norm. Rewards contribute to the satis-
faction of these goals without the agent having
to make any extra effort. As a result, those goals
that benefit from rewards must no longer be con-
sidered by the agent to be satisfied, and must be
removed from the set of goals.
• Rejected norms only affect the set of goals hin-
dered by the associated punishments. This set of
goals must be removed; this is the way in which
normative agents accept the consequences of
their decisions.
To make the model simple, we assume that pun-
ishments are always applied, and rewards are always
given, though the possibility exists that agents never
become either punished or rewarded. In addition,
note that the set of goals hindered by normative goals
can be empty if the norm being considered is a non-
conflicting norm, and goals hindered by punishments
or goals that benefit from rewards can be empty if a
norm does not include any of them. After norm com-
pliance, the goals are updated and, consequently, the
intentions of agents might change. The process to
comply with the norms an agent has decided to fulfill
is specified in the NormComply schema. Through
this process, the set of goals is updated according to
our discussion above.
NormComply
∆NormAgentState
let ngs ==
⋃
{gs : PGoal |
(∃n : intended • gs = n.ngoals)} •
let hngs ==
⋃
{gs : PGoal | (∃n : intended •
gs = hinder (goals,n.ngoals))} •
let brs ==
⋃
{gs : PGoal | (∃n : intended •
gs = benefit(goals,n.rewards))} •
let hps ==
⋃
{gs : PGoal | (∃n : rejected •
gs = hinder (goals,n.punishments))} •
( goals ′ = (goals ∪ ngs)\
(hngs ∪ brs ∪ hps))
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a normative frame-
work which, besides providing the means to compu-
tationally represent many normative concepts, can be
used to give a better understanding of norms and nor-
mative agent behaviour. The framework explains not
only the role that norms play in a society but also the
elements that constitute a norm and that, in turn, can
be used by agents when decisions concerning norms
must be taken. In contrast to other proposals, our
normative framework has been built upon the idea
of autonomy of agents. That is, it is intended to be
used by agents that reason about why norms must be
adopted, and why an adopted norm must be complied
with. Our framework consists of three main compo-
nents: a canonical model of norms, a model of nor-
mative multi-agent systems and a model of normative
autonomous agents.
The model of norms differs from others (Boman,
1999; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1995; Tuomela,
1995) in the way in which patterns of behaviour are
prescribed. To describe the pattern of behaviour pre-
scribed by a norm, other models use actions, so that
agents are told what exactly they must do. By con-
trast, we use normative goals, which is an idea more
compatible with autonomous agents whose behaviour
is driven by goals. Agents can choose the way to sat-
isfy the normative goals, instead of being told exactly
how it must be done. Our work also emphasises that
all norms can be represented by using similar compo-
nents, and that they are analysed by agents in similar
ways. However, what makes one norm different from
another is the way in which norms are created, how
long they are valid, and the reasons agents have to
adopt them. These factors enable norms to be divided
into categories such as obligations and prohibitions,
social commitments and social codes.
A collateral result of our work is the proposed
model for interlocking norms. These relations be-
tween norms have already been mentioned in several
papers, especially from philosophical and legal per-
spectives (Ross, 1968), but no ways to model them
have been provided. Dignum’s concept of authori-
sations (Dignum, 1999) attempts to describe norms
activated when others are not fulfilled; however, his
idea and models are incomplete. We claim that this
form of representing connections between norms can
be used not only to represent enforcement and reward
norms, but also to represent things as complex as con-
tracts and deals among agents.
In contrast to current models of systems regulated
by norms (Balzer and Tuomela, 2001; Dignum and
Dignum, 2001; Esteva et al., 2001; Shoham and Ten-
nenholtz, 1995) in which no distinction among norms
is made, our work emphasises that besides the general
norms of the system, at least three kinds of norms are
needed, namely norms to legislate, to punish, and to
reward other agents. By making this differentiation,
agents are able to determine when an issued norm is
valid, when an entitled agent can apply a punishment,
and who is responsible for giving rewards. In addi-
tion, order is imposed on agents responsible for the
normative behaviour of other agents, because their
authority is defined by the norms that entitle them to
exert social pressure. Roles for legislators, defenders,
and promoters of norms become easily identified as a
consequence of the different kinds of norms consid-
ered. Thus, in this framework, the authority of agents
is always supported and constrained by norms.
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